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Abstract 
Our study aims at analyzing Islamic bank efficiency over the period 2001-2008. We 
found that they were efficient at 92%. The level of efficiency could however vary according 
to the region where they operate. Asia displays the highest score with 96%. Indeed, country 
like Malaysia made reforms in order to allow these banks to better cope with the existing 
financial system, display the highest scores. On the contrary countries with Islamic banking 
system do not necessarily display efficiency scores superior to the average. The subprime 
crisis seems to have impacted those banks indirectly. And market power and profitability have 
a positive impact on Islamic banks efficiency, while it is the contrary for their size. The latter 
implies that they do not benefit from scale economy, may be because of the specificity of 
Islamic financial products.   
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Introduction 
 
    Islamic banking is booming in Muslim and non-Muslim countries, since it is shariah 
compliant and is intended to Muslim clients in those countries. Although most of the Islamic 
banks are within Middle Eastern and Emerging countries, some universal banks based in 
developed countries have started to satisfy a large demand of Islamic financial products. It is 
the case in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
    It is hard to pinpoint the start of Islamic banking. Islamic financial transactions have 
existed until the 14th century, however no institutions exclusively devoted to banking. Among 
the reasons that could explain the late development of Islamic banks is the powerful rule of 
the conventional banks and some other historical and political reasons (break of the Islamic 
world and the colonization). 
    Islamic finance was introduced by Ahmed Al Najjar3 on experimental basis in a small town 
of Egypt in 1963. Since then, many Islamic Banks have been established in Middle East and 
Asia. Growth of Islamic banking has been increasing ever since, not only in terms of number 
of countries it is operating in, but also in terms of areas of finance it has ventured in. 
    The Egyptian experience was based on the mudaraba4 principle and lasted until 1967. The 
aim was to win the confidence of farmers and workers who were more religious and 
traditionally minded. However, those first Islamic banks were less successful than the 
conventional ones, and were closed for political reasons. 
    In the past couple of decades, many developments in the Islamic world took place and 
favor the development and revival of Islamic finance. The recent unprecedented boost in the 
oil-related income of many Muslim Arab nations induces in those countries inflows of 
petrodollars. Then attacks of 11th September 2001 and more recently the subprime crisis 
encouraged capital flight of Muslims (repatriation) and non-Muslims investors and financiers. 
The Golf region now captures a large concentration of liquidities. Lastly, in order to attract 
these liquidities to their financial markets, many occidental countries such as the UK, the 
USA and recently France encourage their banks offering Islamic banking services (see 
appendix 1 for more details). 
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Several studies examined the development of this particular area of finance. In particular, 
some studies examined the risk that can pose Islamic finance to the international financial 
system, given the amount of petrodollars that they collect and the context of globalization. 
Sudararajan and Errico, 2002 discussed how to take into account the specificity of those 
institutions and their products in the management of financial risks; the same for Čihák and 
Hesse, 2008. They studied the possible channels through which Islamic finance could impact 
global financial stability. Lastly, Jobst, 2007 examined legal and economic implications of 
shariah compliance on the configuration of Islamic securitization transactions. 
 
Other studies assessed Islamic bank efficiency based on financial and management ratio or 
using parametric or non parametric methods, as done for conventional banks. For the first 
group of studies, one can cite Abdus-Samad, 1999; Bashir, 1999 and Hassan and Bashir, 
2003. Those papers focus most of the time on few banks in a country or a very limited 
number of countries. The second group of papers were written by Yudistira, 2003; Al-jarrah 
and Moulyneux, 2003, Hussein, 2004; Hassan, 2005. They studied a limited number of 
Islamic banks settled in one or several countries. Indeed, data on Islamic banks are scarce 
limiting such studies as well as comparative studies across countries. 
     
Our study aims at examining and evaluating the performance of Islamic banks operating in 17 
countries in Middle East, Asia and Africa, but also in United Kingdom. This scope of analysis 
will allow us to compare Islamic bank efficiency through the differences characterizing those 
countries. We used a stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) over the period 2001-2008 to 
estimate a cost-efficiency frontier and derived scores of cost efficiency, while taking into 
account explanatory variables. The current paper is structured in the following way: Section 
(1) analyzes the results of previous studies about the performance and the profitability of 
these banks in Muslim and non-Muslim countries. Section (2) presents the model and the 
sample. The results are discussed in Section (3). We conclude in Section (4). 
1. An overview of the financial literature 
 The market share of Islamic banks increases by 15% per annum (Moody's, 2008), this last 
decade. The emergence and boom of Islamic finance, lead several economist to write on this 
topic. Many studies discussed in depth about the rationale behind the prohibition of interest 
(Chapra, 2000), but also the policy implications of eliminating the interest payments (see 
among others Khan, 1986, Khan and Mirakhor, 1987 and Dar 2003). However, most of the 
existing literature on Islamic banking unleashes various studies made on the measurement of 
performance in Islamic banks: they examine the relationship between profitability and 
banking characteristics.     
A first group of studies are interested in the performance of Islamic banks in a specific 
country, through financial ratios. Those ratios capture (a) profitability, (b) liquidity, (c) risk 
and solvency and (d) efficiency. For instance, Saleh and Rami (2006) focus on the 
performance of the first and the second Islamic banks in Jordan: Jordan Islamic Bank for 
Finance and Investment (JIBFI) and Islamic International Arab Bank (IIAB). They notice that 
they play a major role in financing ventures in Jordan, particularly short-term investment, and 
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both banks have increased their activities and expanded their investment but, the JIBFI still 
has higher profitability. They conclude that Islamic banks have high growth in the credit 
facilities and in profitability. Samad (2004) focused on the post Gulf War period of 1990-
2001 in Bahrain, and examined the performance of the interest-free Islamic banks and the 
interest-based conventional commercial banks. His study shows that there is no major 
difference between the two sets of banks in terms of profitability and liquidity performances 
but there is a significant difference in credit performance. Kader and Asarpota (2007) evaluate 
the performance of the UAE Islamic banks by comparing the Islamic and conventional banks. 
They examine the balance sheets and income statements of 3 Islamic banks and 5 
conventional banks between 2000 and 2004. Their results show that Islamic banks are more 
profitable, less liquid, less risky and more efficient than conventional ones. They conclude 
that the SPL principle (see annex) is the main reason for the rapid growth of Islamic banks 
and suggest that they should be regulated and controlled in a different way as the two kinds of 
banks have different characteristics in practice. 
Again, Samad and Hassan (2000) performed an intertemporal study in which they compared 
the performance of the Bank Islamic Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) between two periods of time 
1984-1989 and 1990-1997. Then they evaluate the interbank performance by comparing the 
BIMB's performance with 2 conventional banks (one smaller and another larger than the 
BIMB) as well as 8 conventional banks. The results show that there is a significant 
improvement of the BIMB performance between 1984 and 1997 but this improvement is less 
important than in the conventional banks. Moreover, Islamic banks are less profitable and less 
risky but more liquid than conventional banks. Moin (2008) compared the performance of 
Islamic banks relatively to conventional banks in Pakistan. The study makes comparison of 
Meezan Bank Limited (MBL) which is the oldest Islamic bank in Pakistan and a group of 5 
conventional banks for the period of 2003-2007. He adopted an inter-bank analysis of the 
income statements and the balance sheets of the two groups. The study found that there is no 
difference in terms of liquidity between the two sets of banks. Besides, the MBL is less 
profitable, more solvent (less risky), and also less efficient comparing to the average of the 
conventional banks but it is improving considerably between 2003 and 2007. This is 
explained by the fact that the latter banks have a dominating position in the financial market 
with a longer history and experience than the Islamic banks in Pakistan which have started 
their business few years back. Sarkar (1999) studies the case of Islamic banks in Bangladesh. 
He finds that Islamic products have different risk characteristics and concludes that prudential 
regulation should be modified. 
Those studies related each to one country and using financial ratios tend to converge towards 
one conclusion. Islamic banks may be as efficient as conventional ones; however there is a 
necessity of reforms, regulation and control for each banking system where they operate.  
 
A second group of studies are interested in Islamic banks across several countries. Bashir 
(1999) and Bashir (2001) examined the balance sheets and the income statements of a sample 
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of 14 Islamic banks in 8 Middle Eastern countries between 1993 and 1998. He analyzed the 
determinants of Islamic Banks' performance, specifically the relationship between the 
profitability and the banks' characteristics. He found that the measure of profitability is an 
increasing function of the capital and loan ratios. Besides, the study highlights the empirical 
role that adequate capital ratios and loan portfolios play in explaining the performance of 
Islamic banks. Factors such as non-interest earning assets and customer and short-term 
financing, etc contribute to the increase of the Islamic banks' profit. Hassan and Bashir 
(2003)5, confirm the results of Bashir (2001) in the sense that the performance of Islamic 
banks is affected not only by the bank's characteristics but also by the financial environment. 
Their results indicate that controlling for macroeconomic environment6, financial market 
structure, and taxation; the high capital and loan-to-asset ratios improve the banks' 
performance. The study also provides an interesting but surprising results such as the positive 
correlation between profitability and overhead; and the negative impact of the size of the 
banking system on the profitability except net on interest margin. 
Lastly, the third group of studies is interested in using efficiency frontier methods. Yudistira 
(2003) analyzed the impact of financial crises on the efficiency of 18 Islamic banks over 
1997-2000. This study is based on a non-parametric approach Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA). It assesses a technical frontier of efficiency composed of best practice banks. The 
efficiency score provided indicates how well a bank transform its inputs in an optimal set of 
outputs. He highlighted the small inefficiency scores of 18 Islamic banks as compared to 
conventional banks. Sufian (2007) adopted the same approach as Yudistira (2003) to examine 
the efficiency in domestic and foreign Islamic banks in Malaysia between 2001 and 2004. He 
provided evidence that these banks improve their efficiency slightly in 2003 and 2004. 
However, domestic Islamic banks are found marginally more efficient than foreign Islamic 
banks. Besides Islamic banks profitability is significantly and positively correlated to three 
different types of efficiency: technical, pure technical and scale efficiencies. 
Lastly, Mokhtar, Abdullah and Al-Habsh (2006) used the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) 
to measure and analyze technical and cost efficiency of Islamic Malaysian banks. Their 
findings show that, on average, the efficiency of the overall Islamic banking industry (full-
fledged Islamic banks and Islamic windows) has increased during the period of study while 
that of conventional banks remained stable over time. However, the efficiency level of Islamic 
banks is still lower than that of conventional banks. The study also reveals that full-fledged 
Islamic banks are more efficient than Islamic windows7 for local banks, while Islamic 
window of foreign banks tend to be more efficient than those of domestic banks.  
Those studies focus on one or a few countries. Our study will cover a large range of countries 
in middle East, Asia, Africa and United Kingdom. Using the SFA we will compare the 
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efficiency of Islamic banks relatively to their geographic situation. Also we will analyze the 
determinants of their efficiency basing our reflection on the sensitive variables cited in the 
literature of Islamic banks efficiency. 
 
2. Model specification and Data 
2.1 Methods of efficiency measurement 
Efficiency is a concept that is close to the economic logic insofar as it involves the 
optimization of behaviour. It’s Farell (1957) who first defines technical efficiency 
measurement as the deviation from an ideal isoquant. We then have two perspectives. On the 
one hand, the maximization of outputs produced from a combination of available inputs 
(output-oriented measure). And on the other hand, the use of minimum quantities of inputs to 
produce a given quantity of output (input-oriented measure). In both cases the idea of 
optimization comes from the desire to avoid waste and to be as efficient as possible in 
achieving the objectives. Measuring the efficiency of banks leads to determine their level of 
performance in terms of distribution of financial services, based on inputs they use. Methods 
for efficiency measurement used in the literature, indicate this ability of banks, since they 
allow calculation of composite indices to take into account this capacity. Islamic banks are 
different from conventional banks, in that they reject any financial activity involving the 
interest perception or financial transactions related to unethical activities (weapons, tobacco, 
alcohol ...). Because the scope of their intermediation activity is redefined and limited, we are 
led to raise the issue of their efficiency in the distribution of such financial services.  
There are two main methods in the literature for efficiency measurement: (1) the non-
parametric approach which comes in two ways: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Free 
Disposal Hull (DFH) analysis and (2) the parametric approach which has three variants: the 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), the Thick Frontier Approach (TFA) and the Distribution 
Free Approach (DFA). The first method is a mathematical linear programming, which 
determines an envelopment surface composed of banks of best practices. The efficiency index 
is derived by reference to any deviation from the ideal surface. The second method is more 
accurate than the first one, because it is possible to estimate econometrically the frontier and 
separate the error term from the inefficiency term. However, it imposes a functional form to 
the efficiency frontier. This frontier function may be a Cobb-Douglas, a Constant-Elasticity-
Substitution or a Translog, depending on the technological form of the firm’s production. The 
inefficiency term derived from the estimate is subsequently used to calculate the efficiency’s 
score. 
2.2 Implementing the stochastic frontier analysis 
In the current study, we retain the parametric approach and use more specifically a stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA). It has the advantage of being more accurate than the nonparametric 
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approach like DEA. As we explained it before, it allows separating the error term of the 
inefficiency term. It is therefore less sensitive to measurement errors and outliers8.  
As objective function, we choose a cost function. It allows taking into account the constraints 
of banks as financial companies, seeking to optimize their financial performance. Thereby 
minimizing the costs induced by the efficiency frontier, we will take into account this 
constraint. As functional form, we choose the Translog, as it best suits the multi-products 
characteristic of banking technology, involving multiple inputs and outputs, cf. Mester 
(1997), Bauer et al. (1998), Roger (1998) and Isik and Hasan (2002). Regarding the 
distribution of error and inefficiency term, studies have been made with different 
assumptions. Meusen and van den Broeck (1977) assume an exponential distribution for the 
inefficiency term, while Stevenson (1980) and Greene (1990) proposed a gamma distribution. 
Finally, Cebenoyan, Coopermann, Register and Hudginns (1993) prefer the semi-normal 
truncated distribution. However, Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993) and Bauer et al. (1998) 
showed by a detailed literature review that the semi-normal distribution has become the 
standard assumption. Moreover comparative studies showed that the different assumptions 
about the distribution of the error term have no impact on the final results. Therefore, we will 
assume a semi-normal truncated distribution, while the random error follows a normal 
distribution. We use the maximum likelihood method for the estimate. Panel data allow us to 
gain in estimation accuracy by increasing the number of data. However, our data are 
unbalanced as some banks are not observed at certain points in time. 
a) Choice of inputs and outputs related to Islamic banks 
 
Estimating efficiency frontier requires the choice of inputs and outputs used and produced by 
Islamic banks. The literature on banking activities, propose two competing approaches: the 
production approach and the intermediation approach. In the first one, bank is expected to 
produce transaction services and information. Products consist of bank accounts opened by 
the bank to manage loans and deposits. Thus bank output is measured in number of accounts 
or transactions. In the intermediation approach, banks are supposed to simultaneously offer 
safe and liquid deposits on the one hand and on the other hand, loans that are riskier and less 
liquid assets. Under this approach, bank products are expressed in monetary amounts of 
deposits, loans and other financial assets. Then banking costs relate to operating costs and 
financial costs. We will use the intermediation approach as it is widely used in the literature. 
It also assesses bank efficiency as a whole. Besides, the principle of Islamic banking is 
participation in the company that is using the funds on the basis of PLS principle. Therefore, 
the intermediation approach emphasizes intermediation function carried out by Islamic banks. 
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appear in the cost inefficiency error component.  
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This led us to determine as inputs labour, physical capital and deposits. The prices of those 
inputs are measured respectively by personnel expenses/total assets (PERSONEXP), other 
expenses/ total assets (OTHEREXP) and income for deposits/total deposits 
(INTERESTEXP). For outputs, we have net loans (LOANS), net liquid assets (LA) and total 
earning assets (SECURITIES). This classification is justified by the fact that Islamic banks 
engage in other types of profitable activities, since they do not charge interest on loans and 
deposits (see table 3). 
In studies of efficiency measurement for production units, economists usually allow for a 
second step. It’s set up to explain the determinants of efficiency. Battese and Coelli (1996) 
showed that the two-step estimate biases the efficiency scores. Indeed, the elements used in 
the second stage to explain efficiency influence its determination in the first step. Thus, by 
excluding them from the expression of the efficiency frontier function, the result is a 
measurement bias. Battese and Coelli advised therefore to introduce in the frontier function a 
vector of explanatory variables. Thus, the computed model will be as equation 1 that follows: 
lnCT ijt = α0 +∑
m
n
αm lnpm ,ijt +∑
s
t
βs lnys,ijt + 1/2∑
m
n
∑
n
m
αm ,n lnpm ,ijt lnpn,ijt +
1/2∑
s
t
∑
t
s
lnys,ijt lnyt,ijt +∑
m
n
∑
s
t
δm ,z lnpm lnys,ijt + zijt + v ijt − uijt
(1) 
where pm and pn are input prices and ys and yt are outputs quantities. Because of the specific 
form of the cost frontier function, we impose constraints on symmetry, αm,n= αn,m and βs,t = βt,s 
homogeneity in prices  Σmαm =1 and adding-up  Σmαm,n =Σnαn,m = Σmδm,s =09. We also 
consider homogeneity constraints by normalizing total cost, the labor price and physical 
capital price by financial capital price.  
The composite error term also takes a specific functional form. The random components, vijt 
are independently and identically distributed according to standard normal distribution, N 
(0;σv2) while the bank inefficiency components, uijt > 0 are independently but not identically 
distributed according to a truncated-normal distribution. The Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
assumes that the inefficiency component of the error term is positive; that is, higher bank 
inefficiency is associated with higher cost. 
 
The inefficiency of bank i in country j at time t is defined as exp (ûijt) where ûijt is the 
estimated value of uijt. However, only the composite error term εijt = vijt - uijt can be observed 
from estimation of the cost function. The best predictor of uijt is therefore the conditional 
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price of the third one.  
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expectation of uijt given εijt = vijt - uijt. To retrieve the inefficiency component from the 
composite error for each bank from the cost function estimation, we use the method of 
Jondrow et al. (1982) to calculate the conditional expectation. To investigate factors that are 
correlated with bank inefficiencies, we use the so called conditional mean model of Battese 
and Coelli (1993, 1995), which permits in a single-step estimation of the cost function and 
identification of the correlates of bank inefficiencies. In particular, the estimation procedure 
allows for bank inefficiencies to have a truncated-normal distribution that is independently 
but not identically distributed over different banks. The mean of the inefficiency term is 
modelled as a linear function of a set of bank-level variables. Specifically, the inefficiency 
terms, uijt are assumed to be a function of a set of explanatory bank-specific variables, zijt  and 
a vector of coefficients to be estimated, θ. In other words, uijt= zijt θ + wijt  (2) 
where the random variable, wijt  has a truncated-normal distribution with zero mean and 
variance, σu2 . The point of truncation is -zijt θ so that wijt > -zijt and uijt > 0. The inefficiency 
component of the composite error term therefore has a truncated normal distribution, whose 
point of truncation depends on the bank-specific characteristics so that the inefficiency terms 
are non-negative.  
To estimate the stochastic efficiency frontier, measures of bank inefficiency and correlates of 
bank inefficiencies given by Equations (1) and (2), we use the Frontier econometric program 
developed by Coelli (1996).  
b) Choice of variables that explain cost-efficiency: 
 
The variables influencing efficiency and therefore enabling to explain it, are related to 
characteristics of the banking firm and its production process, as well as the environment in 
which banks operate. The size of the bank has often been used in the literature as 
determinants of efficiency. Allen and Rai (1996) showed that large banks can take advantage 
on economies of scale by sharing costs in the production process. It is measured by the 
logarithm of total assets. The same authors and more specifically, authors that have worked 
on Islamic banks such as Yudistira (2003) take into account regulatory and competitive 
conditions under which banks operate. Thus a variable used to catch profitability of banks is 
measured by net income/total assets (ROA) (or net income/equity (ROE)); and for Risk 
Taking Propensity we used the ratio equity/total assets. Indeed, Islamic banks refrain from 
charging interests on loans and deposits to devote themselves to the principle of PLS. This 
redefinition of the banking practices lead to new risks that conventional banks do not incur. 
Hence, there is a double interest here in our study to assess the impact of their risk taking 
propensity on efficiency (see table 3). 
Another variable that could have an impact on efficiency is the market share. It is measured 
by the ratio of total deposits of the bank/total deposits in the whole banking system. It can 
increase costs for the banking system in general because it results in slacks and therefore 
inefficiency that can not be solved. However, it can have a positive impact on efficiency, if it 
is the result of consolidation and market selection of the largest and most efficient banks. It 
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appears therefore through lower costs, providing the market is contestable. The GDP per 
capita is a proxy of the level of development. It influences many factors related to demand 
and supply of banking services, mainly deposits and loans. Therefore, countries with a higher 
level of development are supposed to have more developed banking system, with more 
competitive interest rates and profit margins. Demand density for banking products (measured 
by deposits per square kilometre), has a negative impact on costs. In countries with high 
demand density, banks support lower costs in the distribution of banking products. Again, the 
provision of banking services may be affected by population density. In countries where this 
variable is low, banking costs are higher and banks are not encouraged to increase their 
efficiency. We will test wether those variables are significant or not, according to their 
relative correlation. 
 
c) Data sources:  
We used data from balance sheets and income statements in their standard universal version 
of Database Bankscope. The values of the variables are expressed in current dollars and have 
been deflated by the consumer price index of the current year in order to reflect 
macroeconomic differences among countries. The macroeconomic variables come from 
International Financial Statistics, from the IMF, available through DataStream. Total deposits 
in each country for the calculation of market power were converted into dollars using market 
exchange rate end of period.     
3. Empirical Results 
 
Our regression is based on unbalanced panel data of 17 countries from the Middle East (Iran, 
Jordan, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen), from  
Asia (Pakistan, Malaysia, Brunei), from Africa (Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia), but also from United 
Kingdom. This later country has a few Islamic banks where Muslims immigrants can have 
financial services. Including this banks in our sample allow us to see how well they perform 
relatively to their counterparts in country where Muslims are not the minority. The covered 
period is 2001-2008, which allows us to analyze the impact of subprime crisis on Islamic 
banks efficiency; and the total number of observations is 340. Even if the temporal dimension 
of our panel is short and barely captures temporal effects, we enjoy other benefits of panel 
regression, ie flexibility in modeling differences between banks. Precisely to reflect the 
heterogeneity of data, we first led Haussmann test to determine the specification of the panel 
model (Tables 1 and 2). The probability of the test being greater than 10% threshold, it does 
not allow us to discriminate which of the fixed effects model and random effects model is best 
suited to the data. However, statistical observations allow us to choose the most appropriate 
model. For all variables in the model, the Within-variance is inferior to the Between-variance 
(see Table 3). Similarly, the short period of analysis leads us to prefer the random effects 
model. Our choice is reinforced by the idea that the random effects model allows us to take 
into account the one sided error term of the inefficiency for each Islamic bank. By this way, 
we will be able to capture the individual characteristics that are not captured by explanatory 
variables meant to explain efficiency.  
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We first estimate an efficiency frontier with the 3 inputs formerly presented in Section 2. 
However, the cost of deposits which is the income paid to depositors for Islamic banks, is not 
indicated in the financial statements provided by Bankscope for all banks in the sample. 
Therefore, estimate of the frontier, taking into account these three inputs reduces the number 
of available data for estimating and the γ coefficient is not significant. This reflects the non-
existence of the efficiency frontier. This leads us to estimate the efficiency frontier by 
considering as inputs “Personal Expenses” and “Other Expenses”, the latter used to normalize 
“Total costs” and “Personnel Expenses”. At this level our estimation method is to incorporate 
in the estimation of the frontier, explanatory variables for efficiency, one by one taking into 
account their possible correlation (Table 4). 
 
The results are presented in Table 1. We choose as a basis the model with three explanatory 
variables: size (logarithm of Total Assets) Return On Assets (Net Income / Total Assets) and 
Market Power (Bank Deposits/Total Deposits of the whole banking system). The size of the 
bank has a positive sign and therefore a positive impact on total costs. This implies that 
Islamic banks do not know how to benefit from economies of scale. This point could be 
explained by the peculiarity of Islamic financing that meets ethical standards according to the 
Shariah law. Thus, the inability to engage in certain conventional banking practices may limit 
the benefits of scale economies. ROA is a measure of banks profitability impact on efficiency. 
On a theoretical point of view the most profitable banks are the most efficient ones. The 
coefficient of this variable is negative, indicating a negative impact of profitability on total 
costs and therefore a positive one on efficiency. Therefore, it is consistent with theory. Lastly, 
“market power” is not significant. 
 
 
Table 1 hereafter 
 
  
We thereafter conducted robustness tests. Since 4 banks in our sample are located in United 
Kingdom, we proceeded to estimate the efficiency frontier without them. This regression is 
displayed in table 5 (regression i). Although the explanatory variables of efficiency are not 
significant, the signs of the coefficients are the same.  
 
A second robustness test consisted in including in the regression explanatory variables related 
to the macroeconomic environment (following Hassan and Bashir, 2003) in order to control 
this aspect on the efficiency measurement. Despite, the strong correlation among the 
explanatory variables as shown by table 4, we estimated the frontier including per capita GDP 
(GDPc), demand density (Dmde) or population density (DPOP) and the propensity to take 
risk (Risktaking). Results are shown in table 5 (regression ii). Results are qualitatively the 
same than the regression (2) in table 1. In addition, “market power” becomes significant with 
a negative coefficient. So when we take into account in the regression the macroeconomic 
environment, Islamic banks with important market power are more efficient in the distribution 
of Islamic financial services. GDP per capita is not significant, as well as the demand density 
(and alternatively the density of the population). On the contrary, the variable 
"RISKTAKING" depicts a small but significant negative coefficient. These qualitative results 
are the same when we remove from the sample, banks operating in Great Britain, table 5 
(regression iii). 
 
12 
 
Based on those robustness checks, we then choose regression 2 in table 1 as our basis model, 
for the estimate of efficiency scores. Our results are as follow. Islamic banks are efficient at 
92,72% on average over the period 2001-2008. This efficiency differs depending on the 
region with maximum efficiency displayed by Islamic banks operating in Asia (96,21%). This 
level reflects the strong performance of Malaysian and Pakistani banks that constitute most of 
our Asian sample. Malaysia in particular is emerging as one of the most developed centers in 
Islamic finance, after Iran and Saudi Arabia. Since 1975 the government has reformed the 
financial system, so that it promotes the development of Islamic banking alongside 
conventional finance. This was especially possible through the Malaysian Islamic Banking 
Act of 1983. For the Pakistani case, since 1978, the government has fostered the 
transformation of the banking system through the constitution of Commission for 
Transformation of Financial System (CTFS), and the establishments of Islamic Banking 
Department by the State Bank of Pakistan. Thus the government accompanied and framed this 
transformation through an appropriate regulatory system.   
 
Besides, Islamic banks operating in Africa displayed an average efficiency score of 93,34%, 
with 92,75% for Sudan whose banking system is essentially Islamic (government legislation). 
On the other hand, Islamic banks operating in United Kingdom have an efficiency of 93,25%. 
This country has made efforts to include in its banking regulation, specific rules for Islamic 
banks to better exercise in the British environment. Therefore, those banks attract capital from 
Muslim immigrants and also petrodollars from the Middle East seeking investment 
opportunities. Finally, the Middle East region has an efficiency score of about 92,49%. 
Especially, Iran which banking system is essentially Islamic (government legislation) displays 
an average efficiency of 94,38%. Because of this differences in scores efficiency across 
regions, we integrate in the regression dummies variable, (table 5, regression iv). The dummy 
variable related to the Middle East region (D_middle_East) and to the Islamic banking system 
as government legislation (D_islamicbkgsystem) have very weak negative coefficient but 
significant. These results mean that operating in those countries for Islamic banks is less 
costly. Conversely, the dummy related to the United Kingdom (D_UK) has a positive and 
significant impact on the cost frontier, meaning that operating in United Kingdom is more 
costly.  
  
As a whole, Islamic banks efficiency has a decreasing trend over the period of analysis with a 
peak in 2005. It may be associated with the war in Iraq that began in 2004, which gave rise to 
an oil shock. Petrodollars’ inflows into Islamic banks could explain this peak. Besides, the 
lowest levels of efficiency appear in 2007 and 2008. This period corresponds to the subprime 
crisis. Therefore we wanted to check its impact by using a dummy variable (D_subprime). 
However, it was not significant (table 5, regression iv). Despite the decrease of Islamic banks 
efficiency during this period, we cannot assert that this is due to the crisis.  
 
Figure 1 hereafter. 
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4. Concluding Remarks 
 
 
Islamic banks have expanded significantly in recent years because of increasing petrodollars 
inflows, following the oil shocks. These banks are growing at a rate of 15% per year since the 
early 2000s. And wherever they settle, the authorities try to implement adequate regulation in 
order to enable them to integrate the banking system of these countries. It is within this 
context that our study is inserted to measure and understand what explains the efficiency of 
these banks.  
 
At this purpose, we use the method of stochastic frontier in one step (Battese and Coelli, 
1996). This allows us to integrate in the cost frontier explanatory variables of efficiency. 
Thus, this study shows that size has a negative impact on efficiency indicating that because 
they distribute Islamic financial services, they may not benefit from economies of scale.  
Profitability has a positive impact on efficiency, which is consistent with the literature. 
Finally, market power has a positive impact on efficiency, the more clients Islamic banks 
have, the more efficient they are.  
  
Furthermore, our study shows that in general Islamic banks are efficient with an average of 
92,72%. However there are differences across regions. Banks operating in countries with an 
Islamic banking system are not necessarily the most efficient. The most efficient region is 
Asia (96%), with Pakistani and Malaysian banks. However operating in a country where 
Islamic banking is government legislation or in Middle East is less costly for Islamic banks. 
Another result observed is the decrease in efficiency at end of period (2007-2008). Although 
this period corresponds to the subprime crisis we found no evidence that this decrease was 
due the crisis. A deepening of this study is to measure the efficiency of Islamic banks in 
relation to conventional banks. 
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Appendix 1/ An overview on Islamic Banking 
 
A. Islamic Banking system 
A.1 The banking principles in Islamic Finance 
    Islamic banking has been defined as banking in consonance with the ethos and value 
system of Islam and governed by the principles laid down by Islamic law called the Shari'ah. 
The Shari'ah is "Way to the water". The "way" of Islam in accord with: 
    The Qur'an and the Sunna10 and the Hadith11 (which are the source of Islamic laws), and 
Ijma'12, Qiyas13 and Ijtihad14 (which are used to provide interpretation), facilitate future 
development and implementation of the Islamic judicial system (Pervez, 1990). 
    Islamic banking is expected not only to avoid interest-based transactions, prohibited in the 
Islamic Shari'ah, but also to avoid unethical practices and participates actively in achieving 
the goals and objectives of an Islamic economy. Business and investments made must be 
conducted in a responsible and committed way. 
    There are four basic principles in the Islamic banking: 
1. The sharing of profit and loss (hereafter SPL) principle. When meeting between a 
capital provider and an entrepreneur, the principle of participation condemns 
compensation in the form of interest on capital contribution (riba). Indeed, Islamic 
morality regards as unfair that the provider of capital does not enjoy large profits 
that could be achieved if the contractor receives a fixed fee. And conversely, that 
the lender can require full remuneration even if the project has led to losses. The 
sharing of profits and losses binds the provider of capital and the entrepreneur, 
while providing insurance for the entrepreneur from the pooling of risks that this 
entails. This also has the advantage in terms of resource allocation and efficiency: 
the fund provider has interest to know the borrower and interest in this project. 
                                                           
10
 It is the second source of Islam faith, refers to the Prophet's acts and words which are related to his practice 
of faith. It explains and transmits the Qur'an. 
11
 They refer to tradition or stories of the Prophet. In contrast with the Sunna which was practiced, the Hadith 
are records of what was practiced. They have become a controversy between Islamic groups since there are 
many interpretations of them. 
12
 It is the consensus of the Islamic community, umma. It is through his principle that democracy makes its 
impact on the conduct of Islamic polity. 
13
 It is a deductive analogy by which a jurist applies to a new case a ruling made previously in similar cases. 
14
 It is independent judgment provided by scholars of Islamic laws for which clear principles and procedures are 
stipulated in the Qu'ran and Sunna. 
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Similarly, the fact that the financier will be interested in the result pushes to 
oversee the work of the contractor and ensures that it has no illegal activity.  
2. There are "some" risks (proportional to the efforts) shared by all the partners, 
whether funds are used in commercial or productive ventures. According to the 
Islam vision, the risk is necessary to justify a fee but it is prohibited if it is not 
controllable. The purpose of the contract must exist, be known and assessed at the 
conclusion of the agreement to protect against the imbalance of the transaction 
(gharar). 
3. All funds should preferably finance socially productive activity. The bank can 
therefore under no circumstances engage in alcoholic beverage trade or in the pork 
meat trade or any other activities explicitly prohibited by the Islamic law. 
4. The prohibition of Usury (the collection and payments of interest, also commonly 
called the Riba). Islamic finance deals only with certain aspects of conventional 
finance. Indeed according to the Shari’ah, the cardinal sin of economic activity is 
the riba. It is the undue increase of wealth. The collection of remuneration without 
effort or risk is prohibited. Therefore, no contract between economic agents must 
disclose directly or indirectly paid or received interest by any of the contractors. A 
compensation is fair only if it is the counterpart of a real job. Instead, it is possible 
to calculate the profit of an economic agent on the basis of the rates on the 
conventional market. Similarly, contracts to receive a variable remuneration or the 
occurrence of an event are likely to generate a rating imbalance of the transaction, 
(gharar). 
These principles are accompanied by strong constraints that must be taken into account in the 
commercial and financial arrangements. According to cases, conventional finance will 
provide tools to meet them. Often, there will be established a specialized engineering to 
combine several techniques to achieve the goal under the constraints imposed. 
Those financial products are designed in order to eliminate in economic transactions Riba as 
well as many others such as Gharar (risk or uncertainty) and Qimar (speculation). (has been 
rewritten for a better transition) 
    A depositor in an Islamic bank can therefore make earnings on his or her deposit in several 
ways: 
• Through return on his capital if it is employed to finance an investment. 
• Through profit's sharing if his capital or a share of his capital is employed in a 
partnership. 
• Through rental earnings on an asset that has been partially financed by his capital. 
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It is clear from the foregoing that there are five basic Islamic financing contracts that are 
permissible by the Islamic Shari'ah: cost plus (Murabaha)15, leasing and lease purchase (Ijara 
and Ijara wa-Iqtina)16, leasing structured mode (Istinsa)17, profit sharing (Mudaraba) and 
equity participation (Musharaka)18. 
A.2 Categories of Islamic banks 
    There are five categories of operating Islamic banks (Al-Omar et all., 1996): 
• The Islamic Development Bank (IDB) which has a main office in Saudi Arabia and 
three regional offices.19  
• The banks which operate in countries where the whole banking system is overseen in 
some way by religious bodies/institutions (like in Pakistan). 
• The banks which operate in Muslim countries and which co-exist with interest-based 
banks (for example in Jordan, Egypt, Malysia). 
• The Islamic banks in non-Muslim countries whose monetary authorities do not 
recognize their Islamic character (like the Al-Baraka International Bank in London 
and the Islamic Bank in Durban, South Africa). 
• The Islamic banks which exist in non-Muslim countries whose monetary authorities 
do recognize their Islamic character (for instance the Faisal International Bank, FIB 
based on Copenhagen, Denmark registered under the Danish Banking Supervisory 
Board). 
    The Table (1) presents a glance on the presence of Islamic banking in Muslim and non-
Muslim countries: 
                                                           
15
 The Islamic Bank acquires a tangible asset at the request of its customer. Then, the bank sells the asset to its 
customer on a deferred sales basis with a markup which corresponds to the profit of the bank. 
16
 The Ijara transaction is similar to the conventional leasing transaction. However, in Ijara wa-iqtina the 
customer (the lesee) has the option of owing the asset at the end of the contract. 
17
 It is a leasing mode which is used to finance long term or large scale facilities involving like construction of 
manufacturer. Bank can either own the manufacturer and charge the customer a fee based on profits or sell it 
to the customer on a differed basis similarly like in the Murabaha transaction. 
18
 The Islamic bank and the customer invest jointly money into the venture. They agree on the sharing of profits 
and losses. 
19
 Currently, the IDB has 55 member countries. All member countries must be also a member of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference and must pay their contribution to the capital of the bank and accept 
terms and conditions decided upon by the IDB Board of Governors. Its purpose is to support the economic 
development and social progress of member countries and Muslim communities. The IDB participates in equity 
capital and grants loans for productive projects and enterprises. 
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 Islamic Banks (market share, MS) 
No Islamic 
Banks 
Marginal 
presence 
Small MS Medium MS High MS Government 
legislation 
Iraq Algeria Malaysia Bahrain Kuwait Iran 
Libya Lebanon Turkey Egypt Qatar Pakistan 
Morocco Tunisia Yemen Jordan  Sudan 
Oman   Saudi   
Syria   UAE   
 
A.3 Aims of the Islamic banking 
    The first Islamic banks were created to fill a gap in social and economic life of poor 
population. Their first aim is to support individuals by mobilizing their resources and 
increasing their awareness of savings. However, the current Islamic banks seem to support the 
idea that all the other banks (conventional banks) are illicit and have to be replaced by Islamic 
ones (Henry et all. 2004). 
    Islamic banks choose the projects which have the highest rate of profit and are the safest 
and the most socially beneficial. This is why we distinguish two sets of aims in the Islamic 
banking which are closely related: economic and social aims. 
1. Economic aims 
• To satisfy the demand and the financial operations of Muslims today in the framework 
of the principles and percepts of the shari'ah. 
• To invest the capital of Muslims into projects which are permissible by the Islamic law 
to generate licit profits. 
• To establish subsidiaries of the Islamic banks in Muslim and non-Muslim countries 
through the implementation of innovative and various activities. 
• To capture the savings of hundreds of millions of Muslims who have never deposit 
their money in banks such as farmers and artisans. 
2. Social aims 
• To promote and consolidate co operations among Muslims. 
18 
 
• In addition to the economic promoting of Muslim countries, the Islamic Banking 
promotes also social development through the almsgiving (zakat)20 and the creation of 
funds employed in charitable works. 
B. Conventional versus Islamic Banks 
    There are some major differences between the conventional and the Islamic banking. As 
explained before, in contrast with conventional banks which have no business limitations, 
Islamic banks can finance only business not against the teachings of Islam. 
    Finances are given to the customer by a contract of loan (where the bank is the creditor and 
the customer is the debtor) in conventional banks and by a contract of a deferred sale contract 
in Islamic banks: first, the bank buys the goods that the customer requires or appoints him or 
her to do it on its behalf. Later, the bank sells them to the customer. The loan transaction in 
conventional banks is substituted for a buying and a selling transaction in the Islamic banks. 
The selling price is equal to the acquisition's cost plus an agreed profit margin. This price is 
the contracted amount that the customer must repay. 
    If the conventional banks earn their profit by financing the customers at a fixed interest 
rate, the return of the Islamic banks is given by the profits of their trading and investment 
activities: If they face some risks, these risks must be proportional to their efforts when they 
are studying the costumers' business and buying and selling the commodities required by their 
clients. 
    Given finances to the customer through a buying and selling transaction leads Islamic 
banks to face more risk than the conventional banks. In both, they have to take into account 
some risks as credit risks and currency fluctuation and liquidity risks, but only Islamic banks 
share loss as well as profit and they cannot compensate it with any additional charge: if the 
customer is unable to pay, the Islamic bank can neither ask for higher selling price because of 
the delayed settlement dues nor charge additional money such as penalities and compounded 
interest (Al-Omer and Abdul-Haq 1996). 
    Consequently, they have to examine and to understand the customers' investments very 
well. From the point of view of depositors, Islamic banks are less risky than the conventional 
ones (see among others Aggrawal and Yousaf 2000, Hassan and Bashir 2003, Yudistira 2003, 
Sufian 2007, Moin 2008). 
    Some non-Islamic banks in Egypt open "Islamic" branches. Ray (1995) reveals that eleven 
conventional banks are involved in Islamic banking business for different reasons such as 
competing with the Islamic ones but also to attempt to weaken the strongest ones. This is an 
                                                           
20
 Zakat institutionalizes the systematic giving of certain percentage (≃2.5%) of one's wealth each year to 
benefit the poor. It does not include charitable gifts given out of individual generosity and is not a replacement 
for taxes, but is seen as a form of compulsory worship, purification and redistribution. As it necessitates a 
regular reassessment of net wealth, Zakat is thought to help concentrate the mind in encouraging compliance 
with Shari'ah in all financial dealings (Alam, 2004). 
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interesting phenomenon because even these non-Islamic banks contribute therefore to the 
"Islamization" of the whole banking system in Egypt. 
    Another interesting feature is that people involved in the Islamic banking business are 
usually apolitical and some of them deal with both Islamic and conventional banks. In 
contrast with expectations, the Islamic banking is neither the monopoly of the Islamic 
movement nor of its founders (Ray, 1995 and Henry et all., 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
Appendix 2/ Tables and figures 
Table1: estimate for the cost-efficiency frontier 
  (1)   (2) 
constant 1 -0,0228 -0,0166 
(0,0030)*** (0,0039)*** 
lnLOANS -0,1644 1,2770 
(0,0562)*** (0,1239)*** 
lnSECURITIES 1,3954 -0,0050 
(0,0402)*** (0,1160) 
lnLA -0,1055 0,4272 
(0,0781) (0,0856)*** 
ln PERSONEXP 0,2545 -0,3154 
(0,0430)*** (0,0816)*** 
lnLOANS-lnLOANS 0,0531 0,1358 
(0,0105)*** (0,0190)*** 
lnLOANS-lnSECURITIES -0,0120 -0,4229 
(-0,017) (0,0275)*** 
lnLOANS-LA -0,0174 0,0579 
(0,0107) (0,0235)** 
lnSECURITIES-lnSECURITIES -0,0670 0,2525 
(0,0080)*** (0,0244)*** 
lnSECURITIES-lnLA 0,0551 -0,1058 
(0,0202)*** (0,0241)*** 
lnLA-lnLA -0,0166 -0,0045 
(0,0039)*** (0,0078) 
lnPERSONEXP-lnPERSONEXP 0,1519 0,1453 
(0,0150)*** (0,0329)*** 
ln PERSONEXP-lnLOANS 0,0042 -0,2991 
(0,0138) (0,0297)*** 
lnPERSONEXP-lnSECURITIES 0,0624 0,4120 
(0,0149)*** (0,0278)*** 
lnPERSONEXP-lnLA -0,0459 -0,0988 
(0,0084)*** (0,0233)*** 
constant 2 -8,1070 -2,7578 
(0,4285)*** (0,2162)*** 
SIZE 0,2886 0,4988 
(0,0177)*** (0,0343)*** 
ROA -5,6951 -16,3537 
(0,3092)*** (2,1147)*** 
MARKET POWER 0,1526 
      (0,2653) 
Gamma 0,9999 0,9992 
(0,0000)*** (0,0002)*** 
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Log-likelihood ratio 1045,789 1032,3 
number of observation 334   277 
*, ** and *** significant at levels 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 
Table 2: Haussmann test 
    coefficients 
    fixed effects  random effects difference standard error 
lnLOANS 0,3957 0,3995 -0,0038 0,0170 
lnSECURITIES 0,1285 0,1290 -0,0005 0,0222 
lnLA 0,4033 0,4004 0,0029 0,0139 
lnPERSONEXP 0,4172 0,3464 0,0708 0,0386 
lnLOANS-lnLOANS 0,0769 0,0774 -0,0006 0,0023 
lnLOANS-lnSECURITIES -0,1145 -0,1167 0,0022 0,0051 
lnLOANS-lnLA -0,0212 -0,0205 -0,0007 0,0014 
lnSECURITIES-lnSECURITIES 0,1011 0,1021 -0,0010 0,0036 
lnSECURITIES-lnLA -0,0684 -0,0689 0,0005 0,0029 
lnLA-lnLA 0,0329 0,0330 -0,0002 0,0007 
lnPERSONEXPlnPERSONEXP -0,0003 -0,0059 0,0056 0,0032 
lnPERSONEXP-lnLOANS 0,0430 0,0339 0,0091 0,0046 
lnPERSONEXP-lnSECURITIES -0,0564 -0,0397 -0,0167 0,0086 
lnPERSONEXP-lnLA 0,0300 0,0284 0,0015 0,0019 
            
Probability > chi2        0,9664 
 
 
Table 3: statistics for the arguments of the cost-frontier function 
Variable   Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
      lnTOTALCOST overall 6,8564 2,1455 -0,4141 14,5537 
between 2,1481 2,1309 14,5537 
within 0,8524 2,9451 9,1508 
lnLOANS overall 5,1795 2,5465 -2,7988 10,4183 
between 2,4195 -2,1652 9,7068 
within 0,9667 -2,3657 7,7873 
lnSECURITIES overall 6,1571 2,1968 -2,5344 10,7905 
between 2,0720 0,7703 9,9131 
within 0,8574 0,5797 8,6233 
22 
 
lnLA overall 4,5557 2,3734 -3,3302 9,3142 
between 2,1677 -1,5618 8,1801 
within 1,0172 -0,1042 7,8581 
lnPERSONEXP overall 0,0197 1,7043 -4,2028 17,8739 
between 2,2166 -3,5738 16,7185 
within 0,3832 -1,6673 2,4077 
SIZE overall 43,1454 333,6532 -1,6094 4986,9930 
between 253,9436 2,1570 2067,1260 
within 207,4721 -1538,0430 2963,0120 
ROA overall 0,0191 0,0733 -0,8000 0,5399 
between 0,0618 -0,2167 0,3326 
within 0,0531 -0,5642 0,3660 
ROE overall 0,1174 0,2909 -1,1514 4,6680 
between 0,2191 -1,1514 0,9374 
within 0,2411 -1,1628 4,2003 
RISKTAKING overall 0,2372 0,2318 -0,2000 1,0000 
between 0,2090 0,0393 0,9461 
within 0,1184 -0,3217 0,8567 
MARKETPOWER overall 0,1324 0,2006 0,0000 0,9758 
between 0,1825 0,0000 0,7408 
  within   0,0655 -0,1526 0,4372 
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Table 4: Correlation between determinants of cost-efficiency 
  SIZE ROA ROE RISKTAKING MARKETPOWER GDPCP GDPCT DPOP DMDE 
SIZE 1 
ROA 0,0798 1 
ROE 0,0366 0,4540* 1 
RISKTAKING 0,0308 0,2054* -0,0943* 1 
MARKETPOWER 0,009 0,094 0,034 -0,0959 1 
GDPCP 0,0962* 0,1830* 0,0865* 0,2144* 0,0677 1 
GDPCT 0,0793* 0,1578* 0,0503 0,2446* 0,025 0,9210* 1 
DPOP -0,0209 0,1256* -0,0065 0,3399* 0,1947* 0,2053* 0,1724* 1 
DMDE -0,0278 0,1815* 0,0559 0,2725* -0,0503 0,2665* 0,3769* 0,3892* 1 
*, ** and *** significant at levels 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
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Table 5: robustness checks for the cost-frontier function 
  i   ii   iii   iv 
Constant 1 -0,0625 -0,0056 -0,0096 -0,0124 
(0,0499) (0,0023)** (0,0061) (0,0083) 
lnLOANS 2,5293 1,4493 0,3089 0,9609 
(0,7839)*** (0,1727)*** (0,1422)** (0,2095)*** 
lnSECURITIES -1,1307 -0,5267 0,5638 -0,0881 
(0,7233) (0,1192)*** (0,1499)*** (0,0652) 
lnLA 0,4528 0,6301 0,5785 0,7706 
(0,7496) (0,1078)*** (0,1095)*** (0,0619)*** 
ln PERSONEXP -0,4330 -0,4583 -0,0228 -0,3127 
(0,8101) (0,1016)*** (0,0403) (0,1412)** 
lnLOANS-lnLOANS 0,3433 0,0817 0,0655 0,0221 
(0,2934) (0,0247)*** (0,0310)** (0,0470) 
lnLOANS-lnSECURITIES -0,9799 -0,4241 -0,1322 -0,2602 
(0,4328)** (0,0643)*** (0,0641)** (0,0826)*** 
lnLOANS-LA 0,1653 0,1711 0,0276 0,1461 
(0,2779) (0,0090)*** (0,0134)** (0,0210)*** 
lnSECURITIES-lnSECURITIES 0,5365 0,3555 0,1047 0,2555 
(0,2121)** (0,0311)*** (0,0414)*** (0,0289)*** 
lnSECURITIES-lnLA -0,1186 -0,2438 -0,1356 -0,2449 
(0,2991) (0,0233)*** (0,0336)*** (0,0288)*** 
lnLA-lnLA -0,0321 0,0014 0,0232 0,0056 
(0,0788) (0,0078) (0,0066)*** (0,0132) 
lnPERSONEXP-lnPERSONEXP 0,6393 0,3515 0,2885 0,2127 
(0,4496) (0,0385)*** (0,0465)*** (0,0625)*** 
ln PERSONEXP-lnLOANS -0,7617 -0,4907 -0,1574 -0,3221 
(0,7276) (0,0225)*** (0,0701)** (0,0545)*** 
lnPERSONEXP-lnSECURITIES 0,9515 0,5808 0,2290 0,4405 
(0,5218)* (0,0260)*** (0,0433)*** (0,0786)*** 
lnPERSONEXP-lnLA -0,2476 -0,0195 -0,0125 -0,0477 
(0,2927) (0,0148) (0,0248) (0,0237)** 
Constant 2 -0,0963 -4,0654 -3,8440 -1,6478 
(0,1345) (0,3480)*** (0,4988)*** (0,0500)*** 
SIZE 0,0783 0,7460 0,7678 0,4692 
(0,0960) (0,0495)*** (0,0378)*** (0,1121)*** 
ROA -0,0771 -27,3961 -19,7588 -6,4732 
(0,7692) (3,7700)*** (3,5437)*** (0,9813)*** 
MARKET POWER -0,0728 -1,1569 -2,0684 -3,4723 
(0,7532) (0,5545)** (0,6920)*** (0,6496)** 
DPOP 0,0000 0,0000 
(0,0000) (0,0000)*** 
GDPC 0,0008 -0,0030 
(0,0016) (0,0016)* 
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RISKTAKING -0,0001 -0,0001 
(0,0000)*** (0,0000)*** 
D_Middle_East -2,4686E-06 
(0,0000)** 
D_UK 0,0042 
(0,0020)** 
D_islamicbkgsystem -3,0057E-08 
(0,0000)*** 
D_subprime 0,0439 
              (0,5053) 
Gamma 0,9969 0,9999 0,9999 0,9996 
(0,0063)*** (0,0000)*** (0,0002)*** (0,0007)*** 
Log-likelihood Ratio 235,23 1270,12 1186,42 855,8 
Number of observations 261   277   270   267 
*, ** and *** significant at levels 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
(i) Cost-efficiency frontier without Islamic banks in Great Britain 
(ii) Cost-efficiency frontier with the initial sample and macroeconomics variables 
(iii) Cost-efficiency frontier with macroeconomics variables without Islamic banks in   
United Kingdom 
(iv) Cost-efficiency frontier with the initial sample and dummies variables. 
 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of Islamic banks efficiency from 2001-2008. 
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